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Abstract 
Using geo-referenced data on labor outcomes for the city of Bogotá, we 
develop a strategy to identify the effect of the neighborhood informality rate on 
the individual probability of getting an informal job. We found evidence of the 
existence of such neighborhood effects. Those effects operate differently for 
salaried informality than for self-employed informality. 
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1 Introduction 
Labor informality is widely recognized as a major concern of most Latin American 
economies. And as many of contemporary social concerns, our understanding of its 
mechanisms is still precarious. However, economic research has made significant progress 
explaining its causes and consequences: we are closer than ever before to identify the features 
of the economic organism causing this alteration in the labor relations. Like physicians 
treating patients, empirical and theoretical literature has focused on the study of the body 
functioning. Our questions are mainly about the features of firms and workers that make them 
informal. But, so far, we are putting aside the lesson that doctors learned during the 19th 
century, when epidemiology appeared: find the environmental sources! 
That will be our task in this paper, to assess the social channels that make possible the 
transmission of informality in the city, and construct a first approximation to a social urban 
epidemiology of labor informality. Disregarding the environmental influences affecting labor 
informality can make us consider labor informality as an immutable trait of certain firms or 
certain workers. On the contrary, we must be willing to accept that there may be a path 
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leading them to this pattern of labor relations. And one of the possibilities is that this path is 
the job search process. 
The characteristics of the jobs that people have depend on the characteristics of the jobs 
that people can get. Then, we have to take a closer look at the way people seek jobs. There is 
evidence to conclude that an important share of the active population seek jobs through non-
formal channels, like asking for help from relatives, friends and neighbors. So, the features of 
the jobs that this social network can offer will influence the employment status of the job 
seeker. This is the source of infection, the social interaction with people who has already some 
contact with the informal sector. 
A growing body of literature have pointed that social distance is correlated with 
geographical distance, in the extent that a person is more likely to interact with someone 
nearby that with somebody far away. Then, we can analyze the role of the neighborhood in 
the searching process; this is one of the environments in which the worker can find a job. This 
approach brings us two advantages: first, the availability of data about this particular social 
context for worker in the city of Bogotá; and second, the possibility of putting our urban 
epidemiology analysis on a spatial basis. 
In fact, the possibility of a neighborhood component in the likelihood of being an informal 
worker adds a new dimension to this social problem: the segregation. The place of residency, 
in this way, can affect the hire prospects, causing a sort of poverty trap. Those who live in 
neighborhoods with more contact with the informal sector will face slightly higher chances to 
find an informal job and slightly higher difficulties to get a formal job. The results of this 
process are the appearance of neighborhoods with bigger prevalence of informal jobs, 
perpetuated in time, and some spatial concentration of informality across the city. 
These emergent results are common in situations of ‘social interactions’. Segregation, 
social multipliers and spatial correlations are some of the empirical regularities that allow us 
to identify this kind of phenomena. We will take advantage of this to find a suitable 
methodology to isolate the effect of social interactions (at the neighborhood level) on the job 
search process, and particularly in the interaction of the search process and the entry in the 
informal sector. There is not an established and widely recognized method for this analysis, so 
one of the main purposes of this paper will be the comparison of different methodologies of 
the ‘social interactions’ literature in the labor market context. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some related work. 
In section 3 we describe the dataset used, the adequate definition of informality for our 
purposes and the constructions of the variables characterizing the neighborhoods. Section 4 
describes labor informality in Bogotá in terms of job-search channels and spatial location. 
Section 5 presents some of the difficulties for the estimation of neighborhood effects and their 
potential solutions. Section 6 presents the estimations of neighborhood effects. Section 7 
concludes. 
2 Labor informality, job search and neighborhoods effects 
The idea that labor relations are undertaken in an 'informal sector' arises from the study of 
urban labor markets in Africa by Keith Hart (1970; 1973) and ILO (1972). They observed that 
an important portion of the labor is not traded in formal markets, and that many people are 
self-employed and work mainly in subsistence activities. It was necessary to explain the 
existence and operation of what had been so far a dark side of the work relations, and this 
explorations result in the appearing of the dualist labor market approach (Lewis, 1954; Harris 
& Todaro, 1970; Fields, 1975; Piore, 1983): the economy of these developing countries is 
segmented into a modern sector, satisfying the established labor regulations, and a pre-
modern sector. Processes such as migration from the countryside to the city increase the 
labor supply, and the modern sector of the economy does not expand fast enough to 
incorporate them all. As a result, some workers are excluded, having to work in the pre-
modern sector; that is, the informal sector. Tokman (1992) shows that this sector is 
characterized by lower levels of productivity and lower capital accumulation, which in turn 
will translate into lower income levels. 
These explanations have in common a negative view of informality (Portes & Haller, 2004); 
it is seen only as a forced alternative to the narrowness of the modern segment of the labor 
market – and therefore as something involuntary (Atuesta, 2010). Other approaches suggest 
that informality might be a choice for small business owners who find it as a profitable 
strategy. Perhaps the first to explore this path was Hirschman (1970), who argues that, given 
the state’s impossibility to provide appropriate enforcement, small firms are more likely to 
evade labor regulations. De Soto (1989) asserts that state norms generate privileges and 
immobilize the economy, and labor informality is just a response to this, the return of the real 
economy, when the individual expects bigger benefits than costs from avoiding state’s 
regulations. Further studies (Feige, 1990; Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989; Pratap & Quintin, 
2006; Quintin, 2008) have contributed to understand informality as a matter of institutions. 
Maloney (2004), comparing several Latin-American countries, has suggested presence of 
large informal sectors in countries with more flexible labor markets. This suggests that 
informality could be a matter of unregulated micro-entrepreneurship activities. 
A synthesis of these two perspectives can be found in a document by the World Bank 
(Perry, 2007), which recognizes the heterogeneity of the informal sector. There are 
disadvantaged workers who are excluded into informality; they would prefer to work in the 
formal sector but can’t because of the rationing of jobs. But there are also workers who 
voluntarily evade the formal sector; they found better incomes and better working conditions 
(especially flexibility) in the informal sector. 
 
Despite the efforts to understand why some workers enter the informal sector, there is still 
much to explore on this topic. Maybe one of the disregarded aspects in informality research is 
the consequences of social contacts on the job matching process. A growing body of literature 
has sought to demonstrate that references play an important role, either because they 
transmit a signal to potential employers or because they provide access to information on 
vacancies. Montgomery (1991) shows that references are mechanisms to classify applicants 
according to their productivity – as long as employers think that highly productive workers 
refer other highly productive workers. Pellizarri (2010) shows that firms invest more 
resources in recruiting programs when the vacancy is for a high productivity job, and they are 
more likely to use references if the vacancy is for a low productivity job. The, the job search 
channel is related to productivity. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that job search 
through social contacts generate path-dependence and segmentation in the labor market. 
That is, two neighborhoods with similar characteristics but different in their level of 
employment will tend to maintain their inequality – the group with higher levels of 
employment improves their member’s employment prospects, which in turn reinforces the 
group’s advantage in employment levels. 
Recent studies (Uribe & Gómez, 2005; Uribe, Viáfara, & Oviedo, 2009) have used data from 
the Quality of Life Survey 2003 in Colombia to estimate the frequency and effectiveness of use 
of formal and informal search channels2. Almost 75% of the employed population got his job 
with help from a relative or a friend, and 50% of the unemployed uses these contacts as their 
principal mean to obtain a job. Quiñonez (2011) also find that informal search channel are 
less effective and they are related with the rigidities of the Colombian labor market. 
The lesson of this literature is that the social structure is important when analyzing the 
labor market structure. There are social interactions that occur outside markets, which partly 
explain the outcomes we observe. What have referred back as the effect of references is very 
similar to what in other literature is known as peer effect: in addition to individual 
characteristics, the characteristics of the social network or reference group are crucial; in two 
ways, in one hand, they determine the context in which the individual makes decisions 
(contextual effects), but, on the other hand, there could be a direct social interaction that 
makes my peers outcomes affect my outcomes (endogenous effect). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of job search channel implications in regard to the informal 
sector is a less discussed topic. Most of the work in this subject comes from sociology. Portes 
and Haller (2004) states that informal economy, instead of being the ‘real market economy’ 
working, is actually a system of informal exchanges made possible by specific social ties. This 
results in the problem of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), in which the pertinence to the 
same social structure or social network generates the necessary trust to the functioning of the 
informal labor relation. 
We will propose that the contact network of the individual is important to his probabilities 
of establishing an informal labor relation. The amount and quality of the vacancies to which a 
person can apply will depend, if using this search channel, on the size and characteristics of 
his network: if his contacts are informed of vacancies for only a certain branch of activity, or 
only at certain salary levels, or only from small firms that evade the regulation, then these are 
the positions to which he can access. So it would be reasonable to expect the existence of peer 
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effects in informality. If one belongs to a social network in which informal employment 
predominates, then most of the information one would get about vacancies would be in the 
informal sector. 
Sometimes we cannot observe the whole social network of individuals, but just a fraction. 
The neighborhood is one of these cases. Labor market survey usually allows to observe at 
least a fraction of the vicinity of each respondent, and there is evidence that neighborhoods 
are relevant in the social networks. Wellman (1996) finds, for the city of Toronto, that 42% of 
the yearly social contacts with one’s social networks happen with people living less than a 
mile away. Ontari (1999) finds, for the United States, that nearly 20% of the components of 
the social network are physical neighbors. Lee and Campbell (1999) look at “micro-
neighborhoods” for the city of Nashville, defined as groups of 10 adjacent housing units on the 
same block3; they find that almost one third of the neighbors are considered close, and about 
13% of the people that a person can contact to look for a job live in these micro-
neighborhoods. 
Some papers have taken advantage of the geographical distance and neighborhoods 
structure as a way to make observable at least fraction of the social network in which the 
individual is immersed (See Durlauf (2004) for a review on this). Topa (2001) and Conley and 
Topa (2002) analyze the geographic patterns of unemployment, and found spatial 
dependence. This is, the employment rate in certain place shows a close correlation with 
employment rates in surrounding places, and clustering conditions exist: there are places 
with concentration of high employment rate, and places of concentration of low employment 
rates. This is consistent with models of information exchange through local networks. Bayer, 
Ross and Topa (2008) extend this analysis, using the workplace in addition to place of 
residence, to find more robust results. Ioannides and Loury (2004) extend the neighborhood 
effect analysis to other labor outcomes. 
There are two pending task with which this paper will deal. First, the analysis of the 
potential effects of job search channels on the size and distribution of the informal sector is 
still to be done. And second, the analysis of the consequences in the labor market of urban 
neighborhood interactions is a topic that hasn’t been studied in Colombia, and the conclusions 
for the labor market in a Latin American country could be different from what has been found 
in studies done, most of the times, for the United States. 
3 Labor Informality in Bogotá 
3.1 Definition of informality 
The purpose of this paper is to find out what is the effect of the characteristics of the 
neighborhood on the characteristics of the jobs that people have. Then, we should use a 
definition of labor informality that focuses on the quality of the job. Also, we have data about 
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the labor supply, so it does make sense to use a definition of informality designed for labor 
demand (firm’s information). The usual choice in this case is a definition of informality relying 
on social security protection. Guataquí, García, & Rodríguez (2011) propose a ‘strong’ 
definition of informality, which recognizes the difference between the institutional 
environment for wage-earners and independent workers, and for the former includes 
additional institutional features, as the existence of a written labor contract and the 
compliance of minimum wage. 
A wage-earner or a domestic worker is considered a formal worker if he satisfices the 
following conditions: a) he is contributing to health insurance, b) he is contributing to a 
pension scheme or is a pensioner, c) he has a written labor contract, and d) he earns  more 
than 95% of minimum a wage per hour. An independent worker is considered formal if he 
satisfices the following conditions: a) he is contributing to health insurance, b) he is 
contributing to a pension scheme or is a pensioner. An individual is considered informal 
worker if he has a job but is not a formal worker. 
We also show, in the appendix, the estimations with two other definitions of labor 
informality: the ‘weak’ definition of labor informality (by Guataquí, García and Rodríguez), 
which points for the minimum level of acceptable worker’s protection in a labor relation; and 
the PREALC-DANE definition, in which the main characteristic of the informality is the size of 
the firm. 
Table 1: Informality rate 
 
Rate SD 
Strong definition 0.61 0.49 
Weak definition 0.22 0.42 
PREALC-DANE definition 0.46 0.50 
Source: Own calculations, with information from DANE 
 
3.2 Spatial patterns in labor informality in Bogotá 
Labor informality is a relevant concern from an academic and form a normative point of 
view. It is a normative issue (on a welfare perspective) because a significant portion of the 
urban labor force works in worse conditions than those that are considered by the 
Government as the minimal requirements of the labor relations. Formal regulations do not 
cover these jobs, bringing on situations of vulnerability, like the lack of insurance against the 
risks of unemployment, health or aging. Additional to these drawbacks, informal hobs are also 
correlated with lower productivity, lower incomes and tax evasion. And labor informality is an 
academic issue to the extent that many of his mechanism and causes remain unexplored. 
About 61% of the workers in Bogotá are in the informal sector, using the ‘strong definition’ 
of informality as proposed by Guataquí, García and Rodríguez (2011). This implies that only 
39% of the labor relations satisfy the fundamental conditions of social protection of the 
worker. The weak definitions point out that 22% of the labor relations doesn’t even the 
minimum acceptable level of protection.  
But informal and formal workers are not only different in the conditions of their jobs, but 
also in the way they search for them. Table 2 shows the job search channels for formal and 
informal wage-earners4.  
Table 2: Search channel 
 
Formal Informal Total 
Family and acquaintances 57.9 87.6 69.2 
Sent CV to firm 20.6 6.7 15.4 
Employment agency 7.1 1.2 4.9 
Job ads 3.5 1.5 2.8 
Job calls 7.9 0.8 5.2 
SENA employment agency 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Others 1.7 1.0 1.5 
Source: Own calculations, with information from DANE 
 
This shows the importance of taking into account the social interactions effects in the labor 
market. Almost 70% of the employees found his current work by appealing to a relative, a 
friend or an acquaintance. Then, worker’s social group is probably important in the definition 
of what kind of job he can obtain. Even though relatives and acquaintances are prevalent in 
the search process for both formal and informal workers, the channel composition is not the 
same. Almost 60% of those who got a formal job were helped by his social group, and one in 
five got it sending his resume to the employer or an intermediary. For those who got an 
informal job, almost 90% were helped by the social group in the search process. All the other 
search methods seem to be nearly irrelevant for getting an informal job. 
People get informal jobs through social contacts. Someone in one’s the social network 
makes a referral or gives information about job openings and in this way he helps to match 
employer and employee. From the employer’s point of view this way of looking for workers 
can be useful to avoid government surveillance. But that may also be the result of the strategic 
behavior of a firm. Pellizzari (2010) shows that a firm prefers to invest in a recruiting 
program when the vacancy is for a high productivity task, and high productivity employees 
tend to be in the formal sector. In the other hand, the firm prefers to use references if the 
vacancy is for a low productivity job, and low productivity is associated with informality. 
Then, the chances of getting an informal job would depend on the information sets of the 
people in the social group. And their information sets are likely to be associated with their 
labor context: if most of them work in informal activities, they are most likely to hold 
information about informal jobs. If this is so, a person with a lot of relatives and friends in the 
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informal sector will find easier to obtain an informal job. We will observe an association 
between the individual probability of entering the informal sector and the labor informality 
rate in his social context. The nature of the job he is likely to find would depend on the people 
he meets, and the nature of their employments. 
The main problem with this type of hypothesis is that in most of the cases the social group 
is not observable. But there is a social context in which valuable exchange of information can 
be done: the neighborhood. If we accept that some of the individual’s social group can be 
found in his vicinity, then we can hypothesize that a neighborhood with higher prevalence of 
informality will increase the probability of his unemployed workers of finding an informal job. 
And this will generate a segregation process: neighborhoods with higher informality rates will 
tend to remain informal, and neighborhoods with lower informality rates will tend to remain 
formal. This is one of the features of the labor market in Bogota: informality is geographically 
concentrated, and apparently there is some kind of job segregation process. The left panel in 
Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of informality in the city. It is remarkable that there 
are high concentrations of formal employment in the north of the city and accumulation of 
informal employment south and southeast of the city. 
Figure 1: Informality distribution in Bogotá 
  
The map in the left depicts the informality rate by block for the respondents of the GEIH between 2009 and 
2011. The map in the right depicts the unexplained informality rate as the residuals from a linear regression 
of block informality rate and certain socio-economics characteristics of the block (age, gender composition, 
education, family structure, occupation distribution and economic activity composition). 
Source: Own calculations, with data form IDECA and GEIH (DANE). 
 
But this agglomeration of labor informality can be caused, in part, by other kinds of 
segregations: maybe people with lower productivity (due to age, education, etc.) tend to live 
in the same places, or maybe some occupations or economic activities with higher propensity 
to informality tend to locate together. Since some of these neighborhood variables are 
observable, we can try to depict the neighborhood’s informality which is not explained in this 
way. This is what the second panel of figure 1 shows. Most of the segregation seems to have 
vanished. Nevertheless, this is not a strong argument against the existence of social 
interactions effects at neighborhood level, but a consequence of one of the difficulties in the 
estimation of such effects: the reflection problem – it is hard to isolate the effect of the 
informality rate (the endogenous variable) from the effect of other characteristic of the 
context (exogenous variables). 
We can get an insight of the agglomeration of informality using a spatial auto-correlation 
statistic, specifically the Moran’s I. The closer it is to 1, the higher is the correlation between 
one block’s informality rate and the adjacent blocks’ rates5; if the statistic is around 0 then 
there is no correlation between a block’s informality rate and its surroundings’, the 
informality among the city is randomly distributed; and if the statistic is near -1, there is a 
negative association, blocks with high informality rates tend to be surrounded by block with 
low informality rates. Figure 2 show an important spatial correlation, about 0.24. It indicates 
that neighborhoods with high informality tend to be surrounded by other neighborhood with 
high informality. That is consistent with a patron of urban segregation of informality. But, 
when we make the same analysis with the unexplained informality the correlation is positive 
but much lower. Again, because of the reflection problem, we cannot rule out the special 
association. The next section presents some methodologies to overcome these problems. 
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Figure 2: Spatial Auto-correlations – Moran’s I 
Moran’s I for block informality Moran’s I for block unexplained informality 
  
The spatial weights matrix is constructed using the 20 nearest neighborhoods of each spatial unit. 
Source: Calculations in GeoDa, with data form IDECA and GEIH (DANE). 
 
The neighborhood social interaction regarding labor informality outcomes also would have 
influence in terms of variance; it would look as a conformity effect: people tend to get similar 
jobs as their neighborhood, inducing homogeneity between inhabitant of the same vicinity, 
and heterogeneity between distinct vicinities. Table 3 shows the variance decompositions for 
different definitions of neighborhood. It shows the standard deviation of informality status (0 
formal, 1 informal), the standard deviation across neighborhoods (SD between) and the 
standard deviations inside the neighborhood at the individual level (SD within). There is an 
important dispersion across neighborhoods, in part unexplained in terms of individual 
characteristics. We observe greater between dispersion with the smallest definition of 
neighborhood – a standard deviation of 13.6 points in the informality rate across 
neighborhoods. The city is more homogenous in terms of the weak definition of labor 
informality, and the heterogeneity in term of the strong definition of informality or the firm-
size definition is about the same. 
Table 3: Variance decomposition of the informality rate 
Informality definition SD SD between SD within 
Strong 0.488 0.136 0.472 
Weak 0.416 0.081 0.411 
PREALC-DANE 0.498 0.141 0.482 
Source: Own calculations, with data form IDECA and GEIH (DANE). 
 
The evidence reviewed so far indicates the existence of a relation between the location of 
workers among the city and their likelihood to be employed in the informal sector. However, 
this is not enough to establish the existence of a neighborhood effect of the informality rate. 
Geographical variance could be explained by the variance in neighborhood characteristics, or 
by the non-random sorting of households (the choice of neighborhoods by families is 
correlated with unobserved characteristics)6. We will show that, even after controlling for 
these two sources of bias, the neighborhood-level peer effect is important. 
4 Empirical methodology for the study of social interactions 
We have suggested before that the probability of getting certain type of job could be 
affected by the prevalence that type of job among the reference group of the individual. This is 
consistent with a common observation in sociology, in the sense that the reference group to 
which a person belongs can affect the decisions that he takes, or the outcomes that he gets. 
This is an interaction outside the labor market, which we can study in the framework of social 
interactions. 
“Social interactions arise when individuals (or house-holds) affect each other’s 
decisions, preferences, information sets, and outcomes, directly rather than 
indirectly through markets. These interpersonal effects are known as 
endogenous social effects when own decisions and those of others in the same 
social milieu are inter-dependent” (Ioannides & Topa, 2010) 
These endogenous effects induce some empirical regularities that give us clues about their 
presence. First, the interdependence between individual outcomes and group outcomes can 
cause a positive correlation: the environmental influence make the individuals more likely to 
be similar to their group. At the end, we will observe homogeneity between individuals of the 
same group, but heterogeneity between different groups. In a spatial framework, this would 
mean identifiable patterns of segregation. 
Additionally, endogenous social effects can induce social multipliers. A change in a relevant 
characteristic has a direct effect on individual outcomes, but also an indirect effect on the 
peers through the social interaction effect; and the shift in the peer’s outcome generates in 
turn a feedback. In this way the direct effect is amplified; this is the social multiplier, and it 
will cause a variance not explained by individual characteristics (Ioannides & Topa, 2010). It 
is also possible for endogenous effects, under certain circumstances, to generate multiple 
equilibriums, which is also reflected in the variance not explained by individual 
characteristics (Durlauf, Neighborhood effects, 2004). 
The former empirical regularity –the individual-group correlation– has allowed the 
development of methodologies of linear regression analysis to assess the existence and 
magnitude of endogenous social effects7. The latter empirical regularity –the social multiplier– 
has allowed the development of methodologies of variance contrast (Glaeser, Sacerdote, & 
                                                             
6 Families are not distributed randomly in the city, the residence place is an economic decision which is 
influenced by several factors, and what we identify as a neighborhood effect may simply reflect that 
people tend to live around similar people. 
7 In an urban framework, like the one we will use, a common strategy is to use spatial correlation 
analysis. Another possibility, which suitability we will discuss in the next section, is to use group effects 
models. 
Scheinkman, 1996; Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 2003; Graham, 2008). These methods 
employ different informational assumptions, the first using exclusion restrictions and the 
second using covariance restrictions on the error term, but are at the end two sides of the 
same coin (Durlauf & Tanaka, 2008). The decision of use one or the other depends on the 
other features of the identification strategy. In particular, we will see that the solutions to the 
most prevalent problems in the identification of social interactions effects have been built on 
the regression analysis framework. 
However, the identification of social interactions effects has additional complexities. In 
particular, two main issues arise in the estimation: the reflection problem (the confusion 
between endogenous effects and other group effects) and the selection bias (the effect of 
variables associated with the neighborhood selection). To describe those problems and show 
the solutions offered by the literature, we will built on the linear-in-means model (Moffitt & 
others, 2001). 
4.1 Estimation issues 
Part of the identification problem of social interactions is that there are several reasons 
explaining why individual in the same reference group (i.e. they have the same peers, or 
belong to the same neighborhood) tend to behave in similar ways. Manski (1993) classify 
them in three categories: 
 The individual’s outcome is influenced by the group’s outcome (observed or 
expected). This is called the endogenous effect – the endogenous variable for the 
individual is affected by the endogenous variable at the group level. 
 The individual’s outcome is influenced by the group’s characteristics. This is called 
the contextual effect, because the conditions of the reference group are the context in 
which the individual makes choices or gets outcomes. It is also called the exogenous 
effect – the endogenous variable is affected by the exogenous variables at the group 
level. 
 The individual’s outcome is influenced by attributes in which he is similar to his 
reference group, or he faces a similar institutional environment to the rest of the 
group. This is called the correlated effect. 
Sorting is a common type of correlated effect, where the group composition is 
correlated with certain attribute which also affects the outcomes of individuals, 
generating a correlation between individual and group outcomes. This is not a form of 
group-influence, but might be mistakenly seen as such if the sorting attribute is not 
observed. Correlated effects can also be caused by common shocks; in this case the 
correlation between the individual outcome and the group outcome is produced by an 
external influence shared by the reference group members. 
The linear-in-means model is the simplest way to formalize those effects. A naïve model, 
assuming the lack of social interactions spillovers, would describe individual’s outcome in 
terms of individual characteristics: 
𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑟  is the outcome of the i-th individual, who is member of the r-th group and 𝑋𝑖𝑟  in 
a vector of individual characteristics. This is the approach of the papers explaining the 
probability of being informal with individual variables like education, experience, etc. A first 
modification social interaction analysis would propose to this model is the inclusion of 
contextual variables, to assess the effect of the environment on the individual’s outcome. This 
model would take the form: 
𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑍)𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑟  is a vector of individual characteristic which are relevant in the characterization 
of the group. 𝐸𝑟(𝑍) is the vector of these characteristics aggregated at the level of group, so 𝛾 
tell us about the impact of these reference group’s qualities on individual’s outcome. Some of 
the variables that compose 𝑋𝑖𝑟  may be as well in 𝑍, but both sets of variables doesn´t have to 
be identical.  
Although this model includes a first form of neighborhoods effects, it is still not taking into 
account the endogenous effect. In terms of informality, it is telling us the impact of the quality 
of the neighborhood on the probability of working in the informal sector, but it is not telling 
us the principal relation we are looking for, the impact of the informality of the neighborhood. 
The simplest way to include this in our model would be: 
𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑍)𝛾 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑦)𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟 
Where 𝐸𝑟(𝑦) is the group average outcome (i.e., the informality rate). It is possible, 
however, to use other measures of the group behavior than group average. The parameter 𝛽 is 
telling us about the presence and magnitude of the endogenous effect. 
One of the problems of this kind of estimation is that the previous expression cannot be 
estimated if 𝐸𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑟) is just the mean for the whole neighborhood, because this would 
mechanically make 𝛽 = 1. But this depends on the definition of the peer group. A usual 
solution to this problem in the social interactions literature is to use as definition of the 
reference group of an individual every other individual his group. Our approach will be slightly 
different: for the purposes of our analysis the relevant reference group for a person looking 
for a job is every individual who already has a job. 
Two main problems in the estimation of social interactions effects are still subject of 
discussion in the literature: i) the reflection problem and ii) the endogeneity bias, due to 
simultaneity or unobserved correlated effects.  
The reflection problem assess that the group outcome 𝐸𝑟(𝑦) is, in equilibrium, a reflection 
of the group conditions 𝐸𝑟(𝑍), and therefore is not possible to differentiate the endogenous 
effects and the exogenous and contextual effects. In the estimation, this mean lack of 
identification –there will be infinite possible solutions to 𝛽 and 𝛾 (Manski, 1993). We can see 
this by obtaining the group mean outcome as the aggregation of the individual outcomes as 
described by the model. 
Assume 𝑋 = 𝑍 (we will use this assumption in the remainder of the paper), that is to say, 
there is no variables generating individual effects and no group effects8. The result is a linear 
relation of the group mean outcomes and the group characteristics. 
𝐸𝑟(𝑦|𝑋) =
𝛼
1 − 𝛽
+ 𝐸𝑟(𝑋)
𝛾 + 𝜂
1 − 𝛽
 
Replacing the mean group outcome in the equation for individual outcome: 
𝑦𝑖𝑟 =
𝛼
1 − 𝛽
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑋)
𝛾 + 𝛽𝜂
1 − 𝛽
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑟 
Then, the group parameters (𝛾 and 𝛽) are not identified. However, it is possible to 
establish the existence of group effects. If the term 
𝛾+𝛽𝜂
1−𝛽
 is statistically different from 0, this 
means there is either an exogenous effect or an endogenous effect, or both. Recall that this is a 
sufficient condition, and not a necessary one: significance suggest the existence of social 
interaction effects, but lack of significance does not implies their inexistence. 
Brock and Durlauf (2001; 2007) show that a non-linear model can overcome the reflection 
problem present in the linear-in-means model. It is assumed that the individual's decision rule 
can be approached from a non-observable utility. The functional form and distribution of the 
errors assumed by the authors result in a logistic probability model, but can be generalized to 
a more general model. 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑟 = 1|𝑋) = Λ[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑍)𝛾 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑦)𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟] 
The reflection will be less severe in these models as long as it meets certain assumptions, 
which can be condensed into: first, individual and contextual characteristics must be not 
linearly dependent (to distinguish the effect of individual characteristics from the effect of the 
group characteristics); this is granted as long as the individual characteristic have within-
group variation. And second, the relation between 𝑋𝑖𝑟  and 𝐸𝑟(𝑌)must be nonlinear; this is 
granted in a binary outcome model, like probit or logit. In a multinomial-choice model, like a 
multinomial logit, the nonlinearity makes less severe the identification problem due to 
reflection (Brock & Durlauf, 2002). 
The second main problem in the estimation of the effects of social interactions is presence 
of endogeneity, due to simultaneity or unobserved correlated effects –particularly those 
related with residence selection–. The simultaneity problem arises from the possibility that 
the individual’s outcome affects the group’s outcome. If the individual have an informal job 
and he can help their neighbors get informal jobs, then 𝑦𝑖𝑟  can affect 𝐸𝑟(𝑦). In this way 
individual error terms will be correlated to 𝐸𝑟(𝑦), causing endogeneity. 
                                                             
8 The existence of a variable in 𝑋𝑖𝑟  and not in 𝑍𝑖𝑟  help to overcome the reflection problem. 
The unobserved correlated effects are especially relevant in urban studies, like ours for 
informality, because the selection of neighborhoods by the families generates non-random 
sorting. The selection bias appears when the conformation of the reference group depends on 
non-observable variables that also affect the outcome. Then, the members of the group will 
tend to behave similarly, but not because of a mutual interdependence, but because similar 
people choose similar groups. A model with this kind of sorting would be like the following: 
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋) = Λ[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑍)𝛾 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑦)𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟], 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑖𝑟 = 𝐸𝑟(𝐷)𝛿 + 𝑣𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖𝑟 
The term 𝑢𝑖𝑟 includes the correlated effects variables. 𝐷 is a vector of characteristics 
associated to group selection and relevant in the determination of the outcome; 𝑣𝑟 is a group 
disturbance; and 𝜖𝑖𝑟 is the individual disturbance term. If 𝐷 is observable, then there is no 
bias. But it is not, then there will be an omitted variable bias. Since 𝛿 ≠ 0, 𝐸𝑖𝑟(𝑦) and 𝐷 will be 
correlated, and we will mistakenly take a sorting effect as a endogenous effect. 
In brief, empirical studies of social interactions face two main challenges: the reflection 
problem and the endogeneity bias. We will proceed to propose a solution to these problems 
taking advantage of the nature of our study and the possibilities with the data for Colombia. 
4.2 A fixed effects approach using observation of neighborhoods across 
time 
The first step to finding a solution to the three problems described above –reflection, 
simultaneity and unobserved correlated effects– is to determine the adequate variables for 
the individual outcome and the vicinities outcome. The easiest solution is to say: the 
individual outcome is informality status (0 formal, 1 informal), and the neighborhood 
outcome is the average, this is, the informality rate. But this ignores the following question: 
are we interested in the probability of being an informal worker, o in the probability of getting 
and informal job? Our goal is to determine whether an informal worker affects the odds of 
getting an informal job for his neighbors (i.e. if informality is contagious). Then, we should 
focus our attention on individuals who just got his job; and the relevant peer group for our 
analysis are the workers who already has a job. This, additionally, help us to overcome some 
of the estimation difficulties. 
Reflection. Blume & Durlauf (2006) have shown that if the neighborhood average variable 
is lagged –i.e. today’s 𝑦𝑖𝑟  does not depend on today’s 𝐸𝑟(𝑦) but on yesterday’s–, then the 
reflection is broken. In this case 𝐸𝑟(𝑦) is not any more a reflection of 𝐸𝑟(𝑋); it depends now on 
a combination of previous 𝐸𝑟(𝑋). This is what happens when we are comparing people getting 
a job with people who already have a job: the kind of job (formal or informal) that one will 
find depends on the people in the neighborhood who already have an informal job; but this 
means that it depends on the kind of job they found in the past. We are introducing an implicit 
lagged structure 
Simultaneity. The individuals we are studying –people that got his job during the last 
month– are not included in the reference group we are taking into account –people that got 
his job more than a month ago–. Then we can discard the direct effect of individuals over 
group averages. And any other reversal causality is unlikely to have effect, since we are 
comparing the informal status that a worker adopts today, with the informal status that his 
neighbors adopted some time before. Since today realization cannot have effect on previous 
realizations, simultaneity is discarded. 
Selection. Non-random sorting and sharing a common institutional environment are 
difficulties for our estimation as long as they are not observed. A natural way to control for 
this kind of unobserved group effects is to use fixed effects. In a cross-section study we would 
use a nested model. But this is not possible in this context, because the endogenous effect 
variable (𝐸𝑟(𝑦)) and the contextual effects variables (𝐸𝑟(𝑋)) does not vary within the group – 
i.e. everyone in the same neighborhood have the same neighbors. A solution to this problem is 
to add the time dimension to the analysis: if one has observations at various moments, and the 
group outcome changes over time, then multicollinearity is broken. 
We do not have georeferenced panel data in which we can observe individuals over time. 
As we will explain below, our dataset is composed of several cross-sections, and the survey is 
applied to different households each time. But we can observe neighborhoods over time. The 
GEIH survey goes to the same blocks during several quarters, but in each occasion they select 
different segments of houses. They poll different households and different workers, but from 
the same place. Then, we can control for the neighborhood, at the block level, and still have 
variance in the endogenous effects variable – the informality rate. 
Let’s see the example in figure 1. Block A have been divided in five segments, and each 
segment have been surveyed in a different quarter. All the surveyed people live close to each 
other, and one can consider them to be in the same neighborhood. There can be non-random 
sorting in the selection of the residency; however, there is no reason to think that one side of 
the block will be preferred by radically different people than the other. Bayer, Ross, & Topa 
(2008) use measures of sorting on observable attributes to show that people choose the area 
of the city that they prefer, but not the specific block –or the side of the block–. So the fixed 
effect at the block level should account for the self-selection possibility. Nevertheless, the 
informality rate for each period of observation will vary, and identification will be possible. 
Figure 3: hypothetical block visited five times 
 
 Our nonlinear model with will become: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 1|𝑋) = Λ[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝑡𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟𝑡(𝑋)𝛾 + 𝐸𝑟𝑡(𝑦)𝛽 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑣𝑟 + 𝜖𝑖𝑟] 
𝐸𝑟𝑡(𝑋) are the exogenous characteristics in the neighborhood 𝑟, at time 𝑡; 𝐸𝑟𝑡(𝑦) is the 
informality rate (endogenous outcome) in the neighborhood 𝑟 at time 𝑡; and 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed 
effects, controlling for the city-wide common shocks; and 𝑣𝑟 are the neighborhood (block) 
fixed effects. 
This will overcome the problems of correlated effects and selection bias as long as the 
source of unobserved process in time invariant. This is a reasonable assumption to the extent 
that the social composition of the neighborhoods changes slowly, and our sample has only 
three years (2009, 2010 and 2011); moreover, about 64% of the blocks are observed during 
six quarter or less, thus there is not a lot of time for composition changes. The usage of fixed 
effects, instead of random effects, allows us to avoid the assumption of no correlation with 
observable characteristics. Correlated effects can be common institutional environments, 
even informal institutions like tolerance with others breaking the law, or common shocks, like 
the existence of a local source of informal employment. These things are probably related 
with observable characteristics of individual and neighborhoods, like education or type of 
occupation. Thus the orthogonality assumption is not tenable, and fixed effects are better 
suited. 
This methodology exploits the peculiarities of the available data for Colombia. Even 
without a panel dataset, we can take time into account, by taking advantage of the data 
collection process. 
5 Data 
5.1 Dataset 
We use repeated cross-sections from a household survey, the Gran Encuesta Integrada de 
Hogares (GEIH), for the period 2009-2011. The survey is conducted on a monthly basis and 
asks for demographic and socio-economic information, like gender, age, education attainment 
and family structure; and it asks about labor market characteristics, such as employment 
status, income, occupation, economic activity, job type, social security affiliation, firm size, 
time in the same job and unemployed duration, among other things. 
The survey makes a multi-step stratified sample by geographical conglomerates (DANE, 
Metodología Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 2013). Therefore, the data collection has a 
spatial framework we can exploit. The spatial conglomerate they use to make the sampling, in 
each stage, is based in geographic contiguity. Using cartographic information, they divide the 
population in several ‘primary units of sampling’, each of this is divided in several ‘secondary 
units of sampling’ and so on. The final unit of sampling is a ‘segment’, a set of about 10 houses. 
So, the survey inquires a worker and his neighbors. 
The geographical units that organize our dataset are ‘urban sectors’9, ‘urban sections’10, 
and ‘blocks’11 (those are not equivalent to the units of sampling). The city is composed by 606 
urban sectors, each one with 5.866 households and 19.292 residents. Each urban sector is 
divided in urban sections (there is about 4.5 sections per sector), with an average of 912 
households and 2893 residents. Finally, the urban section is divided in blocks (about 17 
blocks per section), each one with 59 households and 181 residents. 
Our data has 59526 respondents in the labor force, but only 53,147 have a job at the 
moment of the survey. They live in 229 urban sectors, of the 606 sectors of the city. They are 
located in 329 different urban sections, and in 821 different blocks. The dispersion of the 
sample is higher in terms of urban sectors than in terms of blocks. This is a consequence of the 
sampling process and the fieldwork design12. 
 
Table 1: Size of the vicinities in the sample 
 
Number of 
geographical units 
 
Residents per 
geographical unit (a) 
 
Households per 
geographical unit (a) 
 
(In city) In Sample 
 
(In city) (In Sample) 
 
(In city) (In Sample) 
Urban sector 606 229 
 
19292 587 
 
5866 170 
Urban section 2718 329 
 
2893 414 
 
912 121 
Block 45680 821 
 
181 164 
 
59 48 
(a) Information about number of residents in the city and the number of households in the city per 
geographical unit is from the Colombian general census of 2005. 
Source: IDECA, GEIH (DANE) and General Census (DANE) 
    
The survey is conducted on the same places for several quarters; not to the same houses, 
but in the same neighborhoods. This is a consequence of the fieldwork design, which 
establishes a segment rotation for the application the survey. Table 5 shows that for about 
94% of the workers in the sample we have several observation of the neighborhood across 
time. In 11% of the cases we have observation for the whole period, one each three months. 
 
 
                                                             
9 The urban sector is designed to be similar to the basic unit of urban territorial organization in 
Colombia, the ‘barrio’ (DANE, 2011). 
10 The urban section is designed to consist of about 20 blocks (DANE, 2011). 
11 The cartographic definition of ‘block’ used in the survey is almost the generic definition, except that a 
few blocks with very small population are grouped together. 
12 It is easier to go to adjacent places to apply the survey. Then it’s better to go to several Blocks within 
the same Section, instead to go to several Sections. 
Table 5: Visits of the survey to the same block 
Number of 
visits per block 
Number of workers 
in the block 
Percentage of 
the total 
1 3,706 6.23 
2 7,569 12.72 
3 8,827 14.83 
4 8,068 13.55 
5 6,428 10.80 
6 7,127 11.97 
7 5,909 9.93 
8 2,761 4.64 
9 1,090 1.83 
10 566 0.95 
11 700 1.18 
12 6,771 11.38 
Source: Own calculations, with information from DANE 
 
 
5.2 Neighborhood variables 
As usual in the neighborhoods effects literature, we use group averages as our 
neighborhood variables. For a neighborhood 𝑟 we will define two groups: the people that got 
his job during the month of the application of the survey, ℐ = {1, … , 𝐼}; and the people that got 
his job more than a month before the application of the survey, 𝒥 = {1, … , 𝐽}. When looking for 
a job during that month, an individual 𝑖 can receive help from one of his employed neighbors 𝑗. 
Therefore, we can see through the labor informality status of individuals 𝑖 how many workers 
were getting an informal job; and we can see through the characteristics of their neighbors 𝑗 
what were the social and economic features of the employed workers in the vicinity at that 
time (like the informality rate). If we find an association between these two variables that 
would be an evidence of neighborhood effects. The neighborhood averages are defined as 
follows: 
𝐸𝑟(𝑍) =
1
𝐽
∑ 𝑍𝑖𝑟
𝑗∈𝒥
 
It is worth noting that our working hypothesis is that a fraction of the social network of the 
individual is found in the vicinity. It does not mean that the neighborhood is the only social 
context relevant in terms of labor outcomes, nor even the most important. 
We neither assert that the entire neighborhood is part of an individual’s social network. 
One appealing criticism to our spatial approach for social interactions is the potential 
inclusion of many ‘irrelevant’ individuals in the reference group, because some people living 
close may have little or none at all interaction with each other. Nevertheless, this will not 
mean a bias in our estimations. This is just the way local interactions works: probably a 
person interacts with some of his neighbors, but not with all of them; most likely only a small 
percentage of the people in the surroundings have an active social tie. This is a sufficient 
condition to the existence of an association between the labor outcomes and the place in 
which people live. Of course if everyone in the neighborhood had an active social tie, then the 
association would be stronger. But the association do not have to be that strong to be relevant 
for labor market analysis. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics - neighborhood variables 
 
Mean SD 
Women 0.46 0.11 
Age 37.95 3.73 
Years of education 9.86 2.54 
Unemployed duration 5.49 3.73 
Participation in communal activities 0.01 0.02 
Unemployment rate 0.12 0.08 
Informality rate (Strong) 0.62 0.17 
Informality rate (Weak) 0.21 0.11 
Informality rate (DANE) 0.48 0.17 
Income per household 2,361,493 2,096,175 
Income per capita 837,094 683,090 
Source: Own calculations, with information from DANE 
 
Geographical distance is one of the relevant dimensions of the social networks. The 
creation and maintenance of social ties is costly, and a greater spatial distance will increase 
this cost. Then, an individual is more likely to interact with persons living close than with 
persons far away (Conley & Topa, 2002). But proximity is not the only feature in determining 
the probability of social contact. Individuals are likely to have social contact with similar 
people in certain socio-economic attributes that we can observe in our data. Akerlof (1997) 
argues that the intensity of the interaction between two persons is positively related to its 
‘social distance’. We will define social distance between the individual and the vicinity for 
variables as age, gender and years of education, in the following way: 
𝐷𝑖𝑟 = |𝑍𝑖𝑟 − 𝐸𝑟(𝑍)|  
We also define distances in occupation and economic activity. Conley and Topa (2002) 
justify the relevance of the occupational distance in terms of informational content: only some 
contacts are useful in terms of getting information about a job opening or generating good 
referrals. A neighbor with a different occupation or working a different economic activity is 
less likely to transmit relevant information. 
For an individual 𝑖, living in the neighborhood 𝑟 and working in the occupation 𝑐, the 
occupational distance will be defined as: 
𝑂𝐷𝑖𝑟 = (1 − 𝑂𝑐𝑟)   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝑐 
Where 𝑂𝑐𝑟 is the percentage of employed workers in 𝑟 with occupation 𝑐. The definition for 
economic activity is analogous. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics - social distances 
 
Block 
 
Mean SD 
By gender 0.51 0.12 
By age 12.67 7.33 
By years of education 2.75 2.12 
By log. Income 3.55 1.16 
By economic activity 0.21 0.15 
By occupation 0.26 0.16 
Source: Own calculations, with information from DANE 
 
6 Results 
Table 8 shows the estimations of endogenous effect for the linear model, the linear model 
with fixed effects, the nonlinear model with a logistic distribution, the nonlinear model with 
random effects –the estimation suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001)–, the nonlinear model 
with fixed effects using the unconditional estimator, and the nonlinear model with fixed 
effects using the conditional estimator. In all the estimations, except the one with random 
effects, we allow within-block correlation of the error term to correct the effect of selection of 
neighborhoods and unobserved variables on variances (Soetevent & Kooreman, 2007). The 
reported parameters are the marginal effects, the logarithm of the odds ratio and the odds 
ratio. The latter is included to assess the comparability of the nonlinear models, to the extent 
that the marginal effects cannot be computed for the conditional fixed effects estimation. 
The comparison between the linear model and the nonlinear model gives an insight about 
the magnitude of the reflection problem, in so far as the latter is expected to have smaller 
biases because of this. Whilst the marginal effect for the former is slightly bigger, there is not a 
significant difference (the relevant comparisons are between columns 1 and 3, and between 
columns 2 and 5). Therefore, it is probable that the reflection problem do not generate large 
biases. 
The inclusion of the random and fixed effects accounts for the existence of time-invariant 
correlated effects, especially those arousing from sorting and the unobserved component of 
the common local environment. We first try the random effects specification (shown in 
column 4), upheld by Brock and Durlauf (2001). The result is essentially the same as in the 
basic nonlinear model. But this is not a consequence of the inexistence of confounding factors, 
but a consequence of an inadequate assumption. As we have mentioned before, this approach 
requires no correlation between the unobserved confounding factor and the individual or 
neighborhood characteristics. This, in terms of self-selection in neighborhoods, implies that 
unobserved variables affecting the neighborhood selection is not related to education, 
occupation or family structure. On the other hand, in terms of common institutional 
environment, this implies that the neighborhood tolerance to job conditions is not related 
with education; or that the impact of a local job opportunity (like a local source of informal 
job) is not related to the workers occupation. These are not tenable assumptions. 
Fixed effects model relaxes the assumption of no correlation between the covariates and 
the neighborhood non-observables, and it can be estimated by maximum likelihood or 
conditional maximum likelihood. On the one hand the maximum likelihood method allows the 
computation of marginal effects, but suffers from the incidental parameters problem (Neyman 
& Scott, 1948), causing inconsistent estimations. On the other hand the conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator is consistent (Chamberlain, 1980), but it does not allow the computation 
of marginal effects13. The magnitude of the bias caused by the incidental parameters problem 
is subject of discussion, but with a small amount of observations per group –in our case, about 
5 workers per block got his job a month before the survey application– there is some evidence 
that the bias could be positive and large (Greene, 2004; Katz, 2001; Heckman, 1981). 
Columns 5 and 6 of table 8 show the estimations by unconditional and conditional 
maximum likelihood respectively. As expected, the unconditional parameter is slightly larger, 
suggesting that the estimation could suffer from the incidental parameters problem. Then, the 
conditional fixed effects model is the best suited for our analysis. Nevertheless, the difference 
in the estimated parameters is small and not significant, so the use of the unconditional 
estimator should not generate big problems and the results will be about the same. 
The interpretation of the odds ratio is not as straightforward as the interpretations of the 
marginal effects. Commonly we present probabilities as numbers between 0 and 1. Using the 
unconditional estimation we could say the probability of getting an informal job is 88% for 
workers in neighborhood in which everyone has an informal job, and 15% less for a worker 
living in a neighborhood in which everyone has a formal job (everything else constant). 
Another possibility is to present these probabilities as odds, this is, as 𝑃/(1 − 𝑃). Then we 
would say that the odds of getting and informal job are 1 in 7.58 in a fully informal 
neighborhood and 1 in 2.71 in a fully formal one. The odds ratio is the ratio of these odds, in 
this case, it is 2.79. This means that the odds of being informal are roughly three times bigger 
in a neighborhood completely informal than in one completely formal. 
                                                             
13 The marginal effect for the nonlinear model with logistic distribution is defined as 𝑀𝐸 =
𝛬(𝑋𝛽)(1 − Λ(𝑋𝛽)), being 𝑋 the vector with the independent variables and the fixed effects. But the 
fixed effects are not computed by the conditional or the random effects estimators, and therefore it is 
not possible to compute the marginal effect. It is possible to compute the marginal probabilities 
assuming all fixed effects to be zero, but these wouldn’t be comparable with the marginal probabilities 
from the other estimations. 
Table 8: Effect of vicinity's informality rate on the probability of getting an informal job 
Models 
 
(1) 
Linear 
(2) 
Linear (FE) 
(3) 
Nonlinear 
(4) 
Nonlinear 
(RE) 
(5) 
Nonlinear 
(UC-FE) 
(6) 
Nonlinear 
(C-FE) 
     
   
Marginal Effect 
 
0.131*** 0.123* 0.123*** 
 
0.142* 
 
 
(0.044) (0.064) (0.041) 
 
(0.077) 
 
     
   
Log. Odds Ratio 
   
1.000*** 1.000*** 1.027* 0.907** 
   
(0.331) (0.311) (0.558) (0.462) 
     
   
Odds Ratio 
   
2.717*** 2.719*** 2.794* 2.476** 
   
(0.900) (0.845) (1.558) (1.145) 
 
    
   
Individual Controls 
 
     
Family Controls 
 
     
Neighborhood Controls 
 
     
Time FE 
 
    

Block FE 
 
 

  
 
Number of obs. 
 
4,385 4,385 4,380 4,385 3,335 3,340 
Number of blocks 
 
761 761 761 761 433 433 
R2   0.203 0.174 0.204 0.189 0.294 0.229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects (RE), Unconditional estimator of Fixed Effects (UC-FE), Conditional estimator 
of Fixed Effects (C-FE). All standard errors, except those from the Nonlinear RE estimation, are estimated with block 
clusters. 
 
It makes no sense, however, to compare neighborhoods with all workers in the formal 
sector versus neighborhoods with all workers in the informal sector. These are not the 
geographical patrons we have identified in the city of Bogotá. Table 9 presents the odds ratio 
for the conditional estimator (as we have pointed before, the best one) comparing a 
neighborhood with an informality rate 10% higher than the city average, versus a 
neighborhood with a rate 10% lower; the table also presents the same comparison for an 
inter-decile range: the 10% neighborhoods with highest informality rates versus the 10% 
neighborhoods with lowest rates. 
Table 9: 20% and inter-decile changes 
20% change odds ratio 
 
1.199 
 
(0.111) 
  
 
Inter-decile odds ratio 
 
1.508 
 
(0.316) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
(clustered in blocks). 
 
Let’s take two workers who were looking for a job, and during the last month got it; one 
live in a neighborhood in the top 10% in term of block’s informality rate, and the other in the 
top 10% in terms of formality. The odds of being informal for the first one are 50% bigger 
than for the other. And a 20% difference in the block’ informality rate would imply that the 
odds of getting an informal job are 20% bigger.  The effect of the block’s informality rate on 
the individual’s probability of getting an informal job is small but significant. We can conclude 
that the existence of neighborhood effects is proven, at least at the level of blocks, since the 
estimation is expected to have no bias due to reflection problems nor to time-invariant 
correlated effects. Location affects employment; and more important, neighbors affect 
employment. 
The magnitude of the effects needs some interpretation. Because we are not taking into 
account all the social network of the individual, only the fraction that is localized in the 
vicinity. And even so, we found a strong effect. The impact of the rest of the social contacts 
could be bigger. 
As we have pointed out before, geographical proximity is not the only determinant of the 
existence and use of social ties. We will show that people with certain attributes is more likely 
to be affected by the informality rate in the vicinity. And we will highlight the importance of 
social distance: when a worker is more alike his neighbors, is more probable that they exert 
some influence on his labor outcomes. In other words, neighborhood effects on informality 
are heterogeneous. 
6.1 The wage-earner and the self-employed 
So far we have treated labor informality as if it were a homogeneous phenomena in terms 
of type of occupation. But it is not. Informality is a situation of precarious working conditions, 
so the role of the employer should not be discarded. Especially if we are analyzing the 
contagion of informality in the neighborhood: it is not the same to get an informal job from a 
firm avoiding regulations, than making your informal job position by yourself. 
Most of the neighborhood effects literature in labor market topics has focused on salaried 
workers, and therefore most of the interpretations of the subjacent social interactions are 
associated to a labor relationship employee-employer. The employed workers can influence 
the labor prospects of the ones looking for job through information flow about vacancies or 
through referrals. But these two explanations are singular to the salaried case: either you hear 
about a vacancy in the firm in which you are working, and tell your neighbor; or your 
employer request you to refer a candidate for the job position. The interpretation of the 
endogenous effect should be different for the self-employed workers. There is not a firm 
offering a job position for self-employment. The contagion channel should be, therefore, a 
different one. 
Young (2001) classifies endogenous effects in three categories: pure conformity, 
instrumental conformity and informational conformity. The first is mimic behavior because 
the utility of the imitation. This kind of behavior could be the case of the role model effect: a 
successful micro-business experience, in informal conditions, can motivate other workers in 
the same direction. The second, instrumental conformity, refers to the benefits that the 
worker receives from behaving in the same way as the other members of the reference group. 
This could be the case of the social support networks studied by Portes & Haller (2004): a 
stronger network operates with more ease. And it can be the situation of the tolerance 
environment for unprotected work, in the sense that a neighborhood with more informal 
worker is less likely to exert social control over the creation of new informal jobs. Finally, 
informational conformity refer to the transmission of information. It can work in a similar 
way to the vacancy case for salaried workers, if there are working opportunities for self-
employment which other independent workers know. Or it is an observations process, in 
which workers realize the opportunities by looking at his neighbors. Or maybe it is a learning 
process, in which self-employed workers learns from others the skills needed for the job. 
Aught, the social interactions effect could be a lot different for someone looking for a 
salaried job than for someone looking for a self-employment opportunity. To make an 
approximation to this dichotomy, we make our estimations with two different endogenous 
effects variables: salaried informal workers as percentage of total workers and independent 
informal workers as percentage of total workers. The results of this estimation is shown in 
table 10. 
 
Table 10: Salaried and self-employed informality 
Models 
 
Marginal effect  
(UC-FE) 
 
Odds ratio 
 (C-FE) 
 
Inter-decile 
Odds ratio 
 (C-FE) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Salaried informality 
(as % of block employment)  
-0.006 
 
0.865 
 
0.951 
 
(0.099) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.351) 
       Independent informality 
(as % of block employment)  
0.243*** 
 
4.904*** 
 
1.805*** 
 
(0.089) 
 
(2.681) 
 
(0.390) 
 
      Individual Controls 
 





Family Controls 
 





Neighborhood Controls 
 





Time FE 
 


 
 
 
Block FE 
 





Number of obs. 
 
3,335 
 
3,340 
 
3,340 
Number of blocks 
 
433 
 
433 
 
433 
R2   0.294   0.229   0.229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We found no evidence of endogenous effects for the neighborhood salaried informality. On 
the other hand, the influence of self-employed informality is big. The odds of getting and 
informal job are 80% bigger for an individual living in a neighborhood in the top 10% in 
terms of informal independent workers as percentage of total employed workers, when 
compared with an individual in a neighborhood in the bottom 10%. It seems that the 
neighborhood effects operate through independent labor. 
6.2 Unemployment in the social interactions framework 
So far, we have focused our attention on the occupied population. We have studied the 
probability of getting an informal job, taking formality as the only alternative. But in reality 
there is another possibility: to remain unemployed. A multinomial logistic model describing 
this situation can be stated as follows:  
Pr(𝑦 = 𝑗|𝑋) = Λ[𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑟𝜂 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑋)𝛾 + 𝐸𝑟(𝑦)𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑟] 
𝑗 = {𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑} 
We use unemployment as the base category. We choose the multinomial logistic model 
instead of a nested model (something like unemployed vs. employed, and formal and informal 
as subcategories of employed), because the later assumes an inexistent dichotomy between 
unemployed and employed. An unemployed can get a formal or an informal job, as well as an 
informal worker can get a formal job, or a formal worker can change his job for an informal 
one. There is not an a priori nesting structure to assume. 
 
Table 11: Unemployment, formality and informality as individuals outcomes 
Models 
ME  
Unemployed  
ME  
Formal 
ME  
Informal 
 
ME  
Unemployed  
ME  
Formal 
ME  
Informal 
 
   
 
   
Salaried informality 
(as % of block employment) 
-0.120** 0.001 0.119** 
 
-0.028 0.002 0.026 
(0.051) (0.007) (0.048) 
 
(0.089) (0.013) (0.082) 
        Independent informality 
(as % of block employment) 
-0.115*** -0.009 0.123*** 
 
-0.104 -0.016 0.120* 
(0.042) (0.006) (0.040) 
 
(0.067) (0.010) (0.062) 
 
   
 
   
 
       Individual Controls   

  
Family Controls   

  
Neighborhood Controls   

  
Time FE   

  
Block FE    
 
  
Number of obs 10,761 10,761 10,761 
 
7,892 7,892 7,892 
Number of blocks 808 808 808 
 
430 430 430 
R2 0.575 0.575 0.575   0.600 0.600 0.600 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 The marginal effects of the informality rates are quite similar to what has been shown in 
table 8, so the consideration of the role of unemployment do not change the general results of 
our analysis. But note that a neighborhood with more informal workers implies higher 
probability of finding an informal job, but it does not implies lower probabilities of getting a 
formal job; this is, if you have greater ease to get an informal job, that does not mean you will 
necessarily stop looking for a formal job. It just decreases your probabilities of being 
unemployed. Informality could be a settler against unemployment, more than a substitute of 
formal employment. 
7 Conclusions 
This is, as far as we know, the first attempt to assess the neighborhood effects on labor 
informality using the social interactions framework. The study of neighborhood effects in 
developed countries has been centered in other labor outcomes, like unemployment. In 
developing countries this literature is starting to grow, but the availability of georeferenced 
data has been a major complication, especially for the most robust empirical designs that 
requires panel data. Our work overcomes some of these problems, with a creative design that 
benefits form the available Colombian data, and set up a methodology that can be used in 
future research on neighborhood effects in the country. 
Almost 9 in 10 informal salaried workers found his job with help from relatives, friends 
and acquaintances. This suggest the importance of the social ties in the job matching process. 
And this have implications in terms of informality: if most of my social contacts have informal 
jobs, it raises my probabilities of getting an informal job. In other words, labor informality is 
contagious. 
The evidence for the city of Bogotá suggest the importance of the neighborhood in the job 
search process, and the spatial correlations are consistent with the existence of social 
interactions at the neighborhood level, affecting the entry probability of informality. We found 
a robust relation between the vicinity’s rate of informality and the individual probability of 
getting an informal job. Even after adequate corrections for the reflection, simultaneity and 
selection bias, there is evidence about the existence of this kind of peer effects. 
Salaried and independent workers are different in several ways, and the presence of 
neighborhoods effects is one of them. The neighborhood affects the probability of getting and 
informal job as a wage-earner and also as an independent worker. An analysis assuming 
homogeneity between these different kinds of working relations will lead us to wrong 
interpretations of the labor market behavior and the peer effects. Further work should review 
the social interactions influences for independent workers – the transmission channel is 
subject to further research. 
Finally, we would want to use these results to contradict the metaphor we portray in the 
introduction. Maybe informality is contagious. But maybe it is not a disease at all, and it is just 
an underlying social process –at least self-employed informality–: people learn from each 
other how work relations should be; and different social contexts generate different informal 
institutions. Maybe public policy against informal jobs should not focus only on incentives, but 
in the process leading worker to precarious job conditions. Maybe labor informality is not in 
the labor market, but in the streets. 
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